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Chief, Declass Br
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

Mr. Gilpatric called and asked that I get the following items to you as quickly as possible. He stated initially that he wanted the JCS to consider several matters; however, as you will note later, some of the work can be accomplished by the Joint Staff or one of the Services.

1. He would like to have CINCARIB instructed to prepare a list of control measures, riot-control equipment, and other support which might be needed by certain Latin American countries in the event that the U.S. takes action against Cuba. We should be prepared to provide CINCARIB support and equipments which may be required to bolster "shaky" governments which might be toppled by some large demonstration. Mr. Gilpatric mentioned that perhaps General Krulak or others in the Joint Staff would have this sort of information now.

2. We should determine which Latin American countries would be able to assist the U.S. in a blockade of Cuba to give as much of a multi-lateral aspect to such action as we can. Certain countries have naval resources which could assist and perhaps the action could be taken through the OAS or by other means. He points out that Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic might be counted on, although it is very probable that Brazil and Mexico could not be. Mr. Gilpatric wants to know which countries have naval resources to assist in a blockade, which countries we could depend on, and how we could approach them.

3. We should determine a pretty precise list of what offensive weapons will be included in the blockade. Although general terms could be used in an announcement of the blockade, we should then determine the exact items which would be included, e.g. certain naval vessels, aircraft, communications and electronics equipment, etc. We will need the generic categories of these items.

4. Naval officers who would enforce the blockade will need pretty specific instructions of what items are included and what procedures should be used in enforcing the blockade. Rifles and side arms would not be included, but strike aircraft, MRBM's, Komar torpedo boats, etc. would be considered offensive weapons in terms of this blockade. We

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should contact naval experts for the purpose of determining exactly how the blockade should be conducted. We want to use minimum force to prevent entry of these vessels into Cuba. Mr. Gilpatric then discussed certain procedures such as setting up blockade areas for intercepting ships to proceed to for search, disabling ships which did not comply with blockade instructions, but not sinking ships unless absolutely necessary. We should also be prepared to meet Soviet naval vessels as well as merchant ships. In this connection he would like to know how we intend to cope with unidentified submarines if they would not surface for inspection.

5. Mr. Gilpatric wants the JCS to consider the pros and cons of blockading aircraft as well as ships. He understands that the Soviets have few long-range aircraft which are capable of un-refueled flight to Cuba. Perhaps we could effectively blockade aircraft by getting agreement of Canada, Guinea, and Ghana to not re-fuel Soviet aircraft enroute.

6. Lastly, he would like to have looked into the difficulties which would be introduced in a U.S. blockade by interference through complementary activities of Alpha 66 craft or similar units. He feels that such activities might lend a much more stringent guide to our blockade than we had intended to and might complicate our blockade if such groups operate outside the parameters of our operations.

Mr. Gilpatric needs information on the foregoing not later than tomorrow morning and preferably tonight.

WILLIAM D. HOUSER
Captain, USN
Military Assistant

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